This paper uses the historical experience of US states to consider why energy intensity has declined in some places more than in others, and whether that difference can help guide other states and countries in pursuing less energy-intensive (and therefore less pollution-intensive) economic growth. The variation in energy intensity across US states has been similar to the changes across countries, and some states -notably California -have been held up as models for the rest of the world by international organizations, such as the World Bank. I show that aggregate US energy intensity fell by 40 percent between 1982 and 2007, and that the decline is not explained by the decreasing industrial share of the US economy or the changing composition of the industrial sector. Across US states, prices and policies are correlated with the decreasing share and composition of manufacturing but not with the technology, or "technique," of production, which appears to be the most important source of US energy intensity gains. Importantly, energy intensity has been declining the most in states where economic growth has been the strongest.
Energy Intensity: Prices, Policy, or Composition in US States
Energy consumption per dollar of GDP -energy intensity -has declined worldwide by 35 percent in the past 30 years. But that global average masks tremendous heterogeneity. In more than one-fifth of the world's countries, energy intensity increased. To reduce global greenhouse gas emissions without reversing economic growth, we must understand how some jurisdictions have been able to reduce their economies' energy intensities. Likely explanations include regulations, energy prices, and industrial composition. And each explanation comes with a different set of policy implications. If regulations explain the reduction, that suggests energy policies have worked as intended, without sacrificing economic growth, relative to jurisdictions that have become more energy intensive. If prices explain the reduction, that supports marketbased policies, such as taxes on energy-intensive industries commensurate with the external costs those industries generate. And if industrial composition explains the reductions in energy intensity, that raises the concern that the differences may involve no more than simply shifting energy around from one jurisdiction to another, without necessarily reducing overall energy use or pollution. Figure 2 plots the same concept across US states, revealing a similar diversity. Energy intensity grew by 46 percent in Alaska but fell by 69 percent in Oregon.
What accounts for this heterogeneity, and have government policies had any effect? To address these questions, I study the historical experience of US states during the 25-year period from 1982 to 2007.
1 There are several advantages to studying states. US energy intensity has fallen even faster than that for the world, the changes in energy intensity across states have been similar to the changes across countries, and some states -notably California -have been held up as models for the rest of the world by international organizations, such as the World Bank. More importantly, in the United States, industry composition can be studied at a highly disaggregated level. The 473 six-digit NAICS codes in the manufacturing sector are measured comparably across US states, ameliorating concerns about industry definition or aggregation bias. And finally, some states are comparable in size to large countries. If California, Texas, New York, and Florida were independent countries, they would rank among the world's top 20 largest economies. What happens in US states matters not just for local and US national policy but for the climate across the globe.
The rest of the paper is divided into three parts. First, I explore as a potential explanation for the decline in energy intensity the fact that manufacturing and other industrial sectors have played a diminishing role in the US economy over time. Nevertheless, that explains only a small part of the decline in US energy intensity. Most of the decline has occurred within sectors, and manufacturing deserves special focus as a large, energy-intensive, and geographically mobile sector. So in the second part of the paper, I look within the manufacturing sector and ask how much of its declining energy intensity is explained by the changing composition of manufacturing -that is, I ask whether the United States is producing relatively more goods whose production is less energy intensive. I show that composition changes do not account for the declining energy intensity of US manufacturing. Most of the decline, then, must be due to "technique" -changes in production processes and technologies that allow narrowly defined industries to produce more output with less energy. Finally, in the third part of the paper I examine how these explanations (declining manufacturing, changing composition, improved technique) differ across US states and see whether those differences are correlated systematically with changes over time in states' energy prices and environmental policies. Some of the studies contradict one another, although it's difficult to tell whether the conflicts arise from using different time periods, countries, sectors, or methodologies. Jakob et al. (2012) examine 15 countries and show that economic convergence -shrinking differences between rich and poor countries -has been accompanied by converging energy intensities. And Duro and Padilla (2011) expand the international analysis to 116 countries. Their results also support the conclusion that overall energy intensity differences across countries seem to be converging. By contrast, Kepplinger et al. (2013) focus on manufacturing and come to a slightly different conclusion. They note that countries with higher gross domestic product (GDP) -industrialized countries -have industrial energy intensities that are both lower and falling faster than those of other countries. In other words, industrial energy intensity is diverging rather than converging.
In this paper I focus on the energy intensity of US states, an approach that enables me to study a far finer disaggregation among sectors than is possible internationally. I also worry less about convergence or divergence and simply describe the source of each state's manufacturing sector energy intensity changes, then explore how those sources might be related to state energy prices and policies. Metcalf's (2008) The simplest way to ask that question is to calculate This is the predicted total energy use (̂) in jurisdiction j and year t, where the prediction is calculated as the current value of output ( ) in sector i times the sum, across sectors i, of the energy intensity in jurisdiction j in the baseline year 1982 ( ,1982 ,1982 ). This prediction ( None of the calculations in equations (1) to (3) are complicated. The only difficulty involves obtaining data with a fine enough degree of disaggregation to separate the composition and technique effects. If the sectoral disaggregation of the economy is too course, some broad categories may have composition changes that get mislabeled as technique changes. For 3 Also see Ang and Choi (1997) and Marrero (2010) .
US State Analyses
example, the manufacturing sector has some industries that are energy intensive and others that are not. If we treat all of manufacturing as one sector in equation (1), we may then call some within-manufacturing reallocation of industries "technique" rather than "composition." In fact, I
believe that this has been a feature of much of the prior research on this topic.
To study this composition-technique distinction carefully, I parse it into two parts. In the next section I examine the composition change between the industrial sector and the other uses of energy in the economy: transportation, commercial, and residential. And in the following section I focus on the manufacturing sector, disaggregated into 473 industries.
The Declining Share of Industry in the US Economy
At first glance, it appears that the declining share of the industrial sector in the overall US economy, in terms of both energy use and output, might explain the declining US energy intensity. Figure 3 plots the shares of overall energy use of the four sectors: industrial, residential, commercial, and transportation. Industry is the only sector that shrank. The second pair of columns in Figure 4 does the same thing for commercial buildings. In this case I don't have a good measure of the change in scale of output, so I use the square footage of commercial buildings. Energy use grew more, from 11 to 18, and energy intensity measured this way declined less. The third pair of columns does the same for residential buildings, where the scale effect is based on population growth. And finally, the last pair of columns scales the transportation sector's energy use by vehicle miles traveled. This last case does appear to rival industry in terms of its contribution to declining US energy intensity. But transportation is nontradable. We cannot import our commutes to work, thereby shifting the resulting pollution from the United States to other countries. And so for transportation energy use, there's less concern about the composition-technique distinctions.
Figure 5 plots the scale, composition, and technique changes to US energy use, where the sectors are defined broadly as either "industrial" or "other." So the composition effect here is really "deindustrialization." The bottom line, "Energy," plots the total energy used in the United
States, indexed so that 1982 equals 100. Energy use grew by 39 percent. The top line, "Scale," is just the real value of GDP, which grew by 125 percent. The middle line, "Scale and Deindustrialization," is the estimate of ̂ from equation (1), indexed so that 1982 equals 100, using only the two broad sectors "industrial" and "other." The top two lines are quite close, suggesting that most of the decline in energy intensity has come from within the industrial sector, not between the industrial and other sectors -that is, it is not due to deindustrialization.
Figure 6 presents that same information in a slightly different way, dividing by scale so that contributions to energy intensity can be seen more directly. The bottom line depicts the overall energy intensity of the United States, which fell by 38 percent to 62 (indexed so that 1982 equals 100). And the top line depicts the decline in overall energy intensity explained by the declining share of industry in overall output. That line falls much less, by only 8 percent.
Again, most of the decline in energy intensity must be within the industrial sector.
Finally, that same pattern holds across US states. Figure 7 plots that middle line -the decline in energy intensity due to the changing industrial share of GDP -for each US state. For most states the industrial share is less than 10 percent. For some, where industrial output grew as a share of gross state product, it is even positive.
These analyses all suggest that the biggest contributor to declining energy intensity in the United States has come within the manufacturing sector. That sector also raises the largest concerns about whether declining energy intensity has been the result of changes in the mix of goods manufactured (composition) or reductions in the amount of energy required to produce each good (technique).
Manufacturing Changes: Composition or Technique?
US states exhibit heterogeneity in the 25-year change in energy intensity within the industrial sector, just as much as they do overall. The next section attempts to answer those questions by comparing differences across all states.
State Prices and Polices
In this section I pose a simple question: what state prices and policies are correlated with states' changing industrial compositions or technique effects? Note that I am careful not to ascribe causation to these correlations; I will repeat that caution several times below. However, it seems like an interesting and important first step to ask whether those states that have enacted energy efficiency standards or seen rising energy prices or been most affected by the US Clean Air Act are also the states whose industrial composition has shifted more toward less energyintensive industries or whose industries have seen the largest technique improvements in energy efficiency. If those improvements are correlated with prices and policies, a natural next step (for another paper) would be to determine whether those relationships are causal. If the improvements are not correlated, the next step would be to determine whether the effect is masked here by another unobserved or simultaneous relationship, or whether the prices and policies enacted really have no measurable effect on energy intensity.
Appendix Table A1 reports the data for two measures of changes in states' energy intensities. The first two columns examine the share of the economy-wide decline in energy intensity that is due to a drop in the industrial sector's importance to the overall economy. The discussion above suggests that in general, declining industry does not explain the US energy intensity decline. But for some individual states the share is larger, and it remains of interest how much that decline may be correlated with state prices and policies.
Columns 3, 4, and 5 of Appendix Table A1 To what extent are variations in these measures of state energy intensity associated with states' prices or policies? Appendix Table A2 gives some measures of those state characteristics,
and Table 2 reports their correlations with the measures of energy intensity, starting with prices.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table A2 report the percentage change in the price of electricity and the average absolute price of electricity, respectively, from 1982 to 2007. 9 Table 2 reports the correlations between these measures of state energy prices and the five measures of state energy intensity reported in Appendix Table A1 . States with high prices (row 1) or steeply rising prices (row 2) had higher-than-average declines in overall energy intensity (column 1). And for states with high prices, a larger-than-average share of that decline came from industry's declining share of gross state product (GSP). That declining industry share is also reflected in column 3, the scale effect of manufacturing. We cannot make too much of these correlations, of course. They are, after all, not demonstrations of causation. States with growing manufacturing sectors may put upward pressure on energy prices. But it does seem that states with the highest and fastestgrowing energy prices saw the steepest declines in the industrial sector as a share of GSP and in the scale of the manufacturing portion of the industrial sector. That said, the earlier discussion demonstrates that the shrinking role of manufacturing accounts for only a small part of states' declining energy intensities.
Column 3 of Appendix Table A2 contains the year the state first implemented energy efficiency standards for building codes, from Aroonruengsawat et al. (2012) . This is intended as an indicator for broader concerns about energy efficiency. Table 2 reports the correlations between the year of building code establishment and the five measures of energy intensity. There seems to be no correlation.
Columns 4 and 5 of Appendix Table A2 explore environmental policies. There are numerous approaches to measuring the stringency of these policies. Galeotti et al. (2015) discuss various measures of environmental and energy policy stringency and develop their own crosscountry measure based on Brunel and Levinson (2015) . Here we use that same approach but for US states, from an index developed in Keller and Levinson (2002) . 10 Column 4 of Table A2 contains the average PACE index from 1973 to 1994, and column 5 contains the change. As 10 The index is based on the US Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey, conducted annually by the US Census Bureau from 1973 until 1994. The Census Bureau published the average annual abatement expenditures by industry and by state. Keller and Levinson (2002) use those published data to calculate the total costs per dollar of manufacturing value added: = ⁄ , where P st is the pollution abatement cost in state s in year t, and Y st is the manufacturing sector's value added state s in year t. They compare that to the predicted abatement costs, ̂, a weighted average of the national pollution abatement costs for each of 20 industries, where the weights are the industries' shares of output in state s, Y sit /Y it . Keller and Levinson's measure of stringency is just the ratio of actual over predicted costs, ⁄ . When this ratio is greater than one, pollution abatement costs are larger than would be expected given the state's industrial composition, and Keller and Levinson infer that the state's regulations are relatively stringent. reported in Table 2 , neither is particularly strongly correlated with the states' change in total manufacturing energy use, composition, or technique. However, states with high average PACE indexes do seem to have a larger share of their energy intensity declines explained by shrinking industrial sectors.
Columns 6 and 7 of Appendix Table A2 list the shares of state government spending on "parks, libraries, arts and humanities" and "infrastructure and communication," respectively, both from Islam (2013) . Back in Table 2 , spending on parks appears negatively correlated with the industrial decline's share of energy intensity decline, positively correlated with manufacturing energy growth, and positively correlated with composition change toward less energy-intensive industries. I suspect that what's really happening is that states with the fastest economic growth spend more on parks -a normal public good that increases with income -and that those states have a large increase in manufacturing energy use but an even larger increase in manufacturing output, offset by energy reductions due to composition and technique.
Column 8 of Appendix Table A2 presents another measure of environmental policy: the share of the state's population living in counties declared out of attainment with federal ambient air quality standards. Nonattainment has been used as a measure of stringency by Henderson (1996) , Becker and Henderson (2000) , and others. Counties that have poor air quality and do not meet federal standards are required by the US Clean Air Act to impose tough regulations to try to come into compliance, and that distinction has been interpreted as an exogenously imposed environmental standard. As reported in Table 2 , states with higher shares of their populations living in nonattainment counties saw larger drops in industry's share of GSP, a larger drop in overall energy use, and a bigger within-industry (technique) decline in energy intensity.
Columns 9 and 10 of Appendix Table A2 give indexes of regulatory policy. The American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE) publishes an annual "scorecard" designed to assess "the progress of state policies and programs that save energy while also benefiting the environment and promoting economic growth."
11 Column 9 contains the ACEEE scorecard for 2006, the first year it was published. In Table 2 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the last column of Appendix Table 2 contains the growth in real gross state product per capita from 1982 to 2007. At the bottom of Table 2 , GSP growth is correlated with declining energy intensity, negatively correlated with the proportion of that decline coming from deindustrialization, and uncorrelated with the scale, composition, or technique of the manufacturing sector.
Conclusions
Although the United States as a whole has experienced a large decline in energy intensity over the past 25 years, individual states exhibit considerable heterogeneity in energy per dollar of output, with some state intensities decreasing much more than the national average and some increasing. This paper shows that deindustrialization has not played a significant role in declining energy intensity, either for the nation as a whole or on a state-by-state basis. Much of the declining energy intensity has been due to changes within the manufacturing sector.
I have correlated those cross-sector and within-sector changes with measures of state energy prices and policies. Although prices and policies do seem to be associated with deindustrialization, they are not correlated with the within-manufacturing technique changes that explain the bulk of energy intensity declines in the United States. In other words, the prices and policies appear correlated with changes to states' economies that are the least important determinants of energy intensity. Changes in the structure of the economy explain drop in total energy intensity more than increased energy efficiency. Figure 4 ; Tables 2, 3 Tol ( , 1949 -1996 65 NAICS industries, 1997 65 NAICS industries, -2006 Decomposition Structural changes in economy account for much of reduction in energy intensity. Tables 1, 4 Bhole ( 
